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a b s t r a c t
We investigate firm heterogeneity in responses to minimum wage changes leveraging on a policy
reform in 2012 in Greece that introduced a youth sub-minimum through a sharp reduction in the
minimum wage that was larger for youth. Using administrative linked employer–employee panel data
and a difference-in-differences estimator, we find that, although wages decreased across all firms
following the policy reform, adult wages decreased by more, whereas youth wages decreased by
less in firms with a higher share of youth in employment. We also find that, in these firms, adult
employment increased by more, while youth employment increased by less or even decreased and that
these changes reflected mainly new hires rather than job separations. These heterogeneous responses
to the change in the minimum wage across firms are not entirely consistent with the competitive
model of the labour market.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
There is a vast literature on the employment effects of mini-
mum wages, but the debate among economists has not yet been
settled (Manning, 2016). In most cases, evidence comes frommin-
imum wage increases, as decreases are quite rare. Nevertheless,
minimum wage decreases may provide an alternative test of the
prediction of the competitive labour market model that there is
a negative relationship between the level of the minimum wage
and employment.
We leverage on the unique case of the drastic reduction of
the minimum wage in Greece in February 2012 that was larger
among youth – the minimum wage decreased by 32% for those
younger than 25 years and by 22% for those who were 25 years
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old or older – to examine whether employers’ responses to
the policy were heterogeneous. We use administrative linked
employer–employee panel data and a difference-in-differences
estimator to identify the short-run effect of this policy on wages
and employment of youth and adults across firms with different
shares of youth in employment.
We find that, between December 2011 and December 2012,
although wages decreased across all firms, adult wages decreased
by more, whereas youth wages decreased by less, relative to those
of adults, in firms with a higher share of youth in employment.
We also find that, in these firms, adult employment increased
by more, whereas youth employment increased by less, or even
decreased in firms with a sufficiently high share of youth in
employment. Our results, however, indicate no significant impact
of the reform on job separations, or differences in job separations
across firms with different shares of youth — implying that the
changes in employment reflect entirely changes in new hires.
Overall, these results suggest heterogeneous responses to the
change in the minimum wage across firms that are not entirely
consistent with the competitive model of the labour market.
2. Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in our analysis were drawn from social se-
curity records of the Unified Social Security Fund (EFKA) that
includes the population of employees and employers in Greece.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109255
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Our sample includes all employees in EFKA for whom the last
two digits of the social security number match a unique randomly
selected two-digit number.1 Records for these employees and
their employers were drawn for every December in 2009, 2010,
2011, and 2012 (descriptive statistics for all variables used in our
analysis are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix).
These employees remain in our sample at any given period,
provided they remain in wage/salaried employment (otherwise
they are coded as ‘‘not in salaried employment’’).
3. Empirical strategy
We estimate the impact of the February 2012 minimum wage
decrease in Greece on firms and their employees using a dif-
ferential trend adjusted difference-in-difference (DID) empirical
strategy that relies on the policy provision stipulating a higher
minimum wage reduction for individuals younger than 25 years.
The first implication of this is that young workers may have po-
tentially been more affected by the policy. The second implication
is that firms with a higher share of employees under 25 years
may have also been affected disproportionately — either due to
differences in the wage elasticity of labour demand2 or due to
differences in labour supply responses (e.g., higher turnover rates
due to higher youth turnover).
We estimate the impact of the reform on employee outcomes
using a differential trend adjusted DID estimator through the
following specification:
∆Oijt = β0 + β1Tt + β2AGE25it + β3Sh25jt−1 + β4Tt ∗ AGE25it
+ β5Tt ∗ Sh25jt−1 + β6AGE25it ∗ Sh25jt−1
+ β7Tt ∗ AGE25it ∗ Sh25jt−1 + β
′
8X i,jt−1 + uijt (1)
where ∆Oijt is the change in the outcome of employee i in firm j
between the initial period, t − 1, and the following period, t; Tt
is an indicator taking the value 1 for outcome changes between
December 2011 and December 2012, and 0 for outcome changes
between December 2010 and December 2011, when no youth
minimum wage was in place; AGE25it is an indicator taking the
value 1 if individual i is younger than 25 years in period t;
Sh25jt−1 is the share of employees younger than 25 years in firm j
in the initial period, X i,jt−1 is a vector of pre-treatment individual
and firm characteristics, and uijt is an error term.
In the case of firm-level outcomes, the specification we esti-
mate is as follows:
∆OFjt = α0+α1Tt +α2Sh25jt−1+α3Tt ∗Sh25jt−1+α
′
4X
F
jt−1+εjt (2)
where ∆OFjt is the change in the outcome of firm j between the
initial period, t − 1, and the following period, t; XFjt−1 is a vector
of pre-treatment firm characteristics, and εjt is an error term.
The inclusion of the level of Sh25jt−1 among the right-hand
side variables of Eqs. (1) and (2) controls for heterogeneity in out-
come trends, in the absence of the treatment, across individuals
and firms that differ in the intensity of the treatment received
(differential trend adjusted DID). The key identifying assumption
of this estimator is that differences in trends between treatment
1 As the number is drawn from the [00, 99] interval, this selection produces
a sample that is approximately 1% of the total population of wage and salaried
employees in EFKA. The two-digit number selected is unknown to us.
2 This follows from the third Hicks–Marshall law of derived demand (Ehren-
berg and Smith, 2012), whereby, under certain conditions, the larger the share
of a factor in production, the higher is its own-wage labour demand elasticity.
and control groups, in the absence of the treatment, in the post-
treatment period are the same as those in the pre-treatment
period (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for supporting evidence).
4. Results
Table 1 presents our differential trend adjusted DID estimates
of the impact of the reform between December 2011 and Decem-
ber 2012 on employee and firm outcomes produced by estimating
Eqs. (1) and (2) respectively. The first column of Table 1 includes
results from the estimation of Eq. (1) using as the dependent
variable the change in the individual log daily wage between
December 2011 and December 2012 (December 2010 and De-
cember 2011 for the pre-treatment period) for individuals who
were in wage/salaried employment in both periods, including
those who changed employer.3 Results show that adult wages
decreased by more in firms with a higher share of youth in
total employment in December 2011 (−0.177, p-value 0.000), but
youth wage decreases did not differ significantly across firms
with different shares of youth.4 Estimates of wage decreases
among youth relative to adults suggest that youth relative wages
decreased in firms with share of youth in employment up to
around 18%.5 In December 2011, these firms were around 93%
of firms in the data, accounting for around 58% of total youth
employment.
Results concerning the employment effects of the reform, es-
timated at the firm-level (second panel of Table 1), show that,
on average, these were positive across age groups. However,
whereas effects on adult and total employment (last two columns
of Table 1) are increasing with the share of youth at the firm, for
youth employment the opposite is the case.
A result of this is that in firms with share of youth in em-
ployment higher than 15%, our estimates indicate either an in-
significant overall effect of the reform on youth employment
or a negative and significant effect.6 In our data, these firms
correspond to around 15% of all firms and account for 48% of total
youth employment in December 2011.
We examine further the dynamics underpinning these em-
ployment adjustments in the second and third columns of Table 1.
3 In this case, as well as in the results on the probability of moving to another
employer in column three of Table 1, the sample is restricted to individuals
who were employed in both periods, and thus results may be subject to sample
selection. While it is difficult to address this using standard sample selection
correction methods, as this requires identifying suitable instruments, we have
checked whether this is a concern in our case by examining whether the
treatment is correlated with selection out of our sample (probability that an
individual leaves wage/salaried employment in the second period, conditional
that they are in wage/salaried employment in the initial period). Results
(available upon request) showed no significant impact of the treatment on the
probability that an individual leaves wage/salaried employment.
4 The corresponding figure is 0.056, calculated as −0.177 + 0.121, with
p-value 0.251.
5 The difference between the marginal effects of the reform on youth and
adult wages for firms with shares of youth in this range was between −0.044
(p-value of the null that the difference is zero, 0.014), for firms with share of
youth 0%, and −0.022 (p-value, 0.097), for firms with share of youth 18%. For
firms with shares above this threshold the effect is statistically insignificant;
while it turns positive, but remains insignificant, for firms with youth shares
above 36%.
6 Based on estimates in column four of Table 1, marginal effects of the reform
on youth employment are positive and statistically significant for firms with
share of youth in employment below 15% (0.035 at 0%, with p-value 0.000, and
0.0143 at 15%, with p-value 0.077); they remain positive, but are insignificant for
firms with youth shares up to 25%; they turn negative, but remain statistically
insignificant for firms with youth shares up to 55%; and they become negative
and statistically significant thereafter (−0.043 at 55%, with p-value 0.098, and
−0.11 at 100%, with p-value 0.024).
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Table 1
Differential trend adjusted difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the February 2012 decrease in the minimum wage on employee and firm outcomes,
Dec 2011–Dec 2012.
Employee outcomes Firm outcomes
Log daily
wage
Probability of leaving
the employer
Probability of moving
to another employer
Log number of
employees below 25
Log number of
employees above 25
Log number of
employees
Dec 2012 −0.074*** 0.006 0.005 0.026*** 0.011*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Dec 2012 x Younger
than 25
−0.036** −0.034 −0.011
(0.016) (0.023) (0.022)
Dec 2012 x Share of
Employees below 25
−0.177*** 0.055 0.115** −0.143*** 0.084** 0.062*
(0.035) (0.058) (0.057) (0.049) (0.038) (0.037)
Dec 2012 x Share of
Employees below 25
x Younger than 25
0.121** −0.023 −0.167**
(0.062) (0.085) (0.081)
Observations 37559 51050 40237 22392 22392 22392
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. In all specifications, the sample is restricted to employees or firms in the private sector and the
share of employees below 25 is measured as deviation from the average share of employees below 25 in total firm employment in 2011. Specifications for employees’
outcomes include controls for employees’ and firms’ characteristics, and specifications of firm outcomes include controls for firms’ characteristics, all measured in
the initial period, but coefficients estimates are not reported. Employee controls include gender, full-time, full daily hours schedule, and occupation (1 digit), whereas
firm controls include industry (1 digit), region, share of female and share of full-time employees.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
The second column includes estimates of the impact of the reform
on the probability of leaving the employer, produced from the
estimation of Eq. (1) using as the dependent variable a binary
indicator taking the value 1 if an individual employed at a given
firm in December 2011 is no longer employed at the same firm
in December 2012 (including both those moving to another em-
ployer and those leaving wage/salaried employment7) and the
value 0 if the individual remains employed in the same firm
in December 2012. Results suggest no significant change in job
separations between December 2011 and December 2012 for
adults (0.006, p-value 0.413) and for youth (0.006 − 0.034 =
−0.028, p-value 0.204). Moreover, estimates also show no sig-
nificant differences in the effect of the reform on separations of
adult and youth employees across firms with different shares
of youth in employment (adults: 0.055, p-value 0.342; youth:
0.055 − 0.023 = 0.032, p-value 0.601). It follows that the
positive employment effect of the reform, as presented in the
sixth column of Table 1, is driven by an increase in new hires
rather than by a decrease in separations; while the evidence of
larger increases in adult employment and smaller increases (in
the majority of cases) in youth employment in firms with higher
shares of youth (columns four and five in Table 1), imply that
these firms hired adults at a higher rate than youth.
The third column presents estimates of the impact of the
reform on a subset of separations, associated with moving to
another job (probability of moving to another employer). These
estimates were produced through estimating equation (1) using
as the dependent variable a binary indicator taking the value 1
if an individual, employed at a given firm in December 2011,
moves to another firm in December 2012, and the value 0 if the
individual remains employed in the same firm in December 2012.
Estimates indicate that moves to another employer among adults
increased by significantly more in firms with higher shares of
youth in employment (0.115, p-value 0.042), whereas, for youth,
these moves did not differ across firms with different shares of
7 This could include a move to unemployment, inactivity, or self
(non-salaried) employment.
youth in employment (0.115 − 0.167 = 0.052, p-value = 0.356).
Although, we do not know the reasons of job separations, one
could make a conjecture that the result for adults is more likely
to reflect higher quits in firms where adult wages decreased by
more.
Overall, observed wage and employment adjustments to the
reform do not seem to be entirely consistent with a negative
relationship between wages and employment, as the competitive
model of the labour market would predict. This is because, we
find that in some firms (those with youth share in employment
higher than 15%), despite the fact that youth wages decreased sig-
nificantly relative to their pre-reform level,8 youth employment
either did not change or even decreased. Moreover, this could
not be explained in terms of substitution of adults for youth,
as youth wages, relative to those of adults, either decreased or
did not change in these firms. Therefore, this seems to be more
in line with models of labour markets with frictions (Manning,
2016), which predict that, under certain conditions, there can be
a positive relationship between changes in wages, arising from a
change in the minimum wage, and changes in employment. Also
consistent with this is the finding that in firms with a higher share
of youth, there were higher decreases in adult wages and higher
probability that adult employees move to another firm.
5. Conclusion
We evaluate the short-run impact of a policy reform in 2012
in Greece, where the minimum wage was reduced by more for
youth, on individual and firm outcomes. Our key finding is that,
although wage and employment adjustments to the reform sug-
gest a negative relationship between wages and total employ-
ment at the firm level, this relationship reflects heterogeneous
responses across firms that are not entirely consistent with the
competitive model of the labour market.
8 Based on estimates in column one of Table 1, marginal effects of the reform
on youth wages for firms in this range, are between −0.115 at 15%, with p-value
0.000, and −0.163 at 100%, with p-value 0.000.
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Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found
online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109255.
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